Scope of this snapshot. An external scan observes
only your public TLS perimeter — typically a small fraction of an organisation's
cryptographic footprint. Internal services, data at rest, PKI, and code-level
cryptography are not visible from the outside and are not assessed here.
Findings
No post-quantum key exchange support
quantum-vulnerable
Your TLS endpoints negotiate only classical key-exchange groups (elliptic-curve / finite-field Diffie-Hellman). Traffic recorded today can be decrypted once these algorithms are broken — the harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure that regulators now expect you to inventory and plan around.
PCI DSS 4.0.1, requirement 12.3.3 — cipher suites and protocols must be documented and their viability actively tracked — mandatory since 31 March 2025.
NIST IR 8547 — RSA-2048 and ECC P-256 deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035.
DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Art. 9(4)(d); RTS (EU) 2024/1774, Arts. 6–7) — in force since 17 January 2025 — requires a documented policy on encryption and cryptographic controls, a register of certificates, and updating cryptography as cryptanalysis develops (RTS Art. 6(4)).
Key exchange without forward secrecy
quantum-vulnerable
Cipher suites using static RSA or static Diffie-Hellman key exchange are accepted. A single compromised private key retroactively decrypts all recorded sessions — the worst harvest-now-decrypt-later profile an endpoint can have.
PCI DSS 4.0.1, requirement 12.3.3 — cipher suites and protocols must be documented and their viability actively tracked — mandatory since 31 March 2025.
DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Art. 9(4)(d); RTS (EU) 2024/1774, Arts. 6–7) — in force since 17 January 2025 — requires a documented policy on encryption and cryptographic controls, a register of certificates, and updating cryptography as cryptanalysis develops (RTS Art. 6(4)).
Certificate relies on a quantum-vulnerable signature algorithm
quantum-vulnerable
Your certificate chain uses RSA/ECDSA signatures. Public web PKI does not yet issue post-quantum certificates, so this is a crypto-agility roadmap item rather than an immediate fix — but it belongs in your inventory and migration plan.
public key: {"size": 2048, "type": "RSA"}
NIST IR 8547 — RSA-2048 and ECC P-256 deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035.
DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Art. 9(4)(d); RTS (EU) 2024/1774, Arts. 6–7) — in force since 17 January 2025 — requires a documented policy on encryption and cryptographic controls, a register of certificates, and updating cryptography as cryptanalysis develops (RTS Art. 6(4)).
Legacy TLS protocol versions accepted
The server still accepts protocol versions that current standards consider end-of-life. Beyond the direct weaknesses, this signals limited cryptographic agility — the capability regulators increasingly ask you to demonstrate.
protocols: TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1
PCI DSS 4.0.1, requirement 12.3.3 — cipher suites and protocols must be documented and their viability actively tracked — mandatory since 31 March 2025.
Method
Protocol, cipher-suite, key-exchange-group and certificate data collected with
sslyze 6.3.1 and cross-checked with testssl.sh.
Post-quantum support probed with a live TLS 1.3 handshake restricted to the
hybrid X25519MLKEM768 group (OpenSSL 3.6.2 7 Apr 2026).
Findings marked “quantum-vulnerable” follow the CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM
convention (nistQuantumSecurityLevel = 0).